Colombia and FARC-EP Struggle for Peace: FARC-EP Delegation: Role 3. General Instructions + Confidential Instructions For Jose Gomez, Peasant Representative to FARC Delegation Custom Case Solution & Analysis

Evidence Brief: Case Extraction

1. Financial Metrics and Economic Data

• Land Concentration: Approximately 0.4 percent of landowners control 62 percent of the productive land in Colombia.
• Rural Poverty: Poverty rates in rural areas exceed 45 percent, significantly higher than the national average.
• Displacement Costs: Over 6 million people have been internally displaced, leading to massive loss of productivity and asset ownership.
• Illicit Economy: Cocoa production serves as the primary income source for thousands of peasant families due to lack of market access for legal crops.
• War Expenditure: Colombia has spent over 10 percent of its annual budget on defense and security for several decades.

2. Operational Facts

• Conflict Duration: The conflict between the Colombian government and FARC-EP has lasted over 52 years.
• Negotiation Structure: Talks are held in Havana, Cuba, under a five-point agenda: Land Reform, Political Participation, End of Conflict, Illicit Drugs, and Victims Rights.
• FARC-EP Composition: A decentralized military structure with various fronts operating across diverse geographical terrains.
• Peasant Representation: Jose Gomez represents the rural agrarian base, focusing on the historical grievances of landless farmers.

3. Stakeholder Positions

• Jose Gomez (Peasant Representative): Demands structural changes to land ownership and the end of the latifundio system. Primary goal is the survival and dignity of the rural worker.
• FARC-EP Secretariat: Seeks a transition to a legal political party without facing physical extermination or legal persecution.
• Colombian Government: Aims for disarmament and demobilization while maintaining the existing economic framework and private property rights.
• Rural Peasants: Require immediate security guarantees against paramilitary groups and investment in infrastructure.

4. Information Gaps

• Specific budgetary allocations for the proposed Land Fund are not defined.
• The exact mechanism for protecting demobilized combatants in remote areas remains vague.
• Detailed census data for land titles in conflict zones is incomplete or non-existent.

Strategic Analysis

1. Core Strategic Question

• How can the FARC-EP transition into a legitimate political entity while securing structural agrarian reforms that satisfy its peasant base?
• How can the delegation ensure the physical survival of its members in a post-conflict environment characterized by paramilitary presence?

2. Structural Analysis

Power Dynamics: The government holds the monopoly on legal legitimacy and international support. FARC-EP holds the power to disrupt economic activity and maintains control over specific rural territories. The negotiation is a stalemate where the cost of continued war exceeds the cost of political concessions for both sides.

Interest-Based Negotiation: The peasants interest is land and safety. The governments interest is stability and foreign investment. The overlap lies in rural development, which can reduce drug production and increase national GDP.

3. Strategic Options

4. Preliminary Recommendation

FARC-EP should pursue a strategy of Political Integration linked to a Mandatory Rural Investment Fund. By trading immediate disarmament for guaranteed legislative representation and a fixed percentage of the national budget for rural infrastructure, the movement can achieve long-term influence. Relying on land redistribution alone is operationally impossible without the administrative power of the state.

Implementation Roadmap

1. Critical Path

• Phase 1 (Days 1-30): Establish a bilateral ceasefire and define the exact coordinates for transition zones.
• Phase 2 (Days 31-60): Launch the National Land Registry pilot in three conflict-affected municipalities to formalize peasant titles.
• Phase 3 (Days 61-90): Formalize the transition of FARC-EP into a legal political party with temporary guaranteed seats in Congress.

2. Key Constraints

• Paramilitary Activity: The presence of armed groups in areas vacated by FARC-EP poses a direct threat to the implementation of land reform and the safety of demobilized members.
• Institutional Capacity: The Colombian state lacks the administrative presence in remote regions to process land titles or provide social services effectively.
• Political Opposition: Urban voters and right-wing parties may block the necessary legislation for political participation and amnesty.

3. Risk-Adjusted Implementation Strategy

The strategy must prioritize the creation of a Joint Security Council involving international observers. This council will oversee the protection of rural leaders. Implementation of land reform must begin with titling existing peasant plots rather than immediate redistribution of large estates to avoid a violent backlash from the landed elite. This phased approach builds trust and demonstrates tangible results to the peasant base before the final disarmament is complete.

Executive Review and BLUF

1. BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

The FARC-EP delegation must prioritize a political settlement that secures immediate land titling and security guarantees for the peasantry. The current negotiation window is closing due to shifting domestic political sentiment. Success requires moving beyond the demand for total land redistribution, which is politically unattainable, toward a model of rural development funded by the state and protected by international oversight. The transition to a political party is the only viable path to long-term survival, provided the government commits to a verified security protocol for demobilized combatants. Failure to secure these guarantees will lead to the fragmentation of the movement into criminalized factions.

2. Dangerous Assumption

The most consequential unchallenged premise is that the Colombian government possesses the operational capacity and political will to fill the power vacuum in rural areas. If the state fails to occupy these territories immediately, paramilitary groups or other insurgent actors will seize control, rendering the peace agreement irrelevant for the peasant population.

3. Unaddressed Risks

• Economic Volatility: A drop in global commodity prices could deplete the national treasury, making the promised rural investments financially impossible (Probability: Medium; Consequence: High).
• Internal Fragmentation: Middle-ranking commanders with ties to the illicit economy may refuse to demobilize, creating a new wave of localized violence that undermines the political party (Probability: High; Consequence: Critical).

4. Unconsidered Alternative

The analysis overlooked the potential for a Decentralized Peace model. Instead of a single national agreement, the delegation could have pursued regional agreements that allow for localized land reform experiments. This would reduce the political pressure at the national level and allow for proof of concept in friendly territories before scaling the model.

5. MECE Verdict

APPROVED FOR LEADERSHIP REVIEW