Colombia and FARC-EP Struggle for Peace: FARC-EP Delegation: Role 2. General Instructions + Confidential Instructions For Carla Fernandez, Rebel For FARC Delegation Custom Case Solution & Analysis

Evidence Brief

Financial Metrics

Estimated cost of peace implementation exceeds 0.75 percent of national Gross Domestic Product annually over ten years.
FARC EP assets are requested for victim reparations but remain unquantified in public records.
Agricultural development funds required for rural reform target 10 million hectares for formalization or distribution.
Illicit crop substitution programs require significant international and state subsidies to match coca revenue.

Operational Facts

Conflict duration spans over 50 years with 220000 deaths and 6 million internally displaced persons.
The five point agenda includes Rural Development, Political Participation, End of Conflict, Illicit Drugs, and Victims Rights.
Negotiations occur in Havana, Cuba, to ensure neutral territory and security for the delegation.
The FARC EP operates as a hierarchical military organization with a Secretariat and Central General Staff.

Stakeholder Positions

Carla Fernandez: Rebel representative focused on social justice, land equity, and the physical safety of demobilizing fighters.
Government of Colombia: Focused on disarmament, demobilization, and the assertion of state sovereignty across all territories.
Rural Peasantry: Demanding land titles and basic infrastructure to move away from illicit economies.
Victims: Seeking truth, justice, and non-repetition of violence.

Information Gaps

Specific legal mechanisms for transitional justice remain undefined in the current phase.
Exact numbers of active combatants and militia members are not independently verified.
The level of commitment from right wing paramilitary groups to honor a ceasefire is unknown.

Strategic Analysis

Core Strategic Question

How can the FARC EP transition from a military insurgency to a legitimate political party without sacrificing ideological goals or risking the physical liquidation of its members?

Structural Analysis

The negotiation landscape is defined by asymmetric power. The state holds international legitimacy and superior air power, while the FARC EP holds territorial influence in rural corridors. Using a Negotiators Dilemma lens, the tension exists between creating value through peace and claiming value through concessions. For the FARC EP, the bargaining power rests on the ability to sustain a low intensity conflict indefinitely, while the government bargaining power rests on the promise of legal inclusion and safety.

Strategic Options

Option 1: The Hardline Ideological Approach. Demand full implementation of land reform and state withdrawal from specific zones before surrendering weapons. This preserves the military leverage but risks a total breakdown of talks and increased military pressure from the state.
Option 2: The Political Integration Approach. Prioritize guaranteed seats in congress and legal amnesties. This allows for a faster transition to civilian life but risks alienating the rank and file who joined for agrarian change rather than political titles.
Option 3: The Phased Security Approach. Agree to a staged disarmament contingent on the establishment of verified security zones and international monitoring. This addresses the primary fear of assassination while maintaining a path toward political participation.

Preliminary Recommendation

The FARC EP should pursue the Phased Security Approach. Securing the survival of the membership is the prerequisite for any political or social goal. Without credible security guarantees, the movement risks the fate of the Union Patriotica in the 1980s.

Implementation Roadmap

Critical Path

Establishment of Bilateral Ceasefire: Immediate cessation of hostilities to build trust and protect civilian populations.
Concentration Zones: Movement of rebel forces into designated areas for verification and protection by international observers.
Weapon Handover: A three stage process of decommissioning arms under United Nations supervision.
Legal Framework for Peace: Congressional approval of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to provide legal certainty for rebels.

Key Constraints

Paramilitary Violence: The presence of illegal armed groups in former FARC territories poses a direct threat to demobilizing rebels.
Internal Factionalism: The risk of dissident fronts refusing to disarm and maintaining control over drug trafficking routes.

Risk Adjusted Implementation Strategy

Implementation must be decentralized. While the leadership negotiates in Havana, regional commanders must see tangible benefits such as local infrastructure projects or land titles to prevent desertion. Contingency plans must include a rapid response mechanism for security threats against demobilized members.

Executive Review and BLUF

Bottom Line Up Front

The FARC EP must prioritize a security first negotiation strategy. The transition to a political party is only viable if the state can guarantee the physical safety of the rebels and provide a clear legal path that avoids standard incarceration. Success depends on converting military leverage into permanent political representation and land reform commitments before the final weapon is handed over. Delaying disarmament until security zones are fully operational is the only way to prevent a repeat of historical massacres of leftist activists.

Dangerous Assumption

The most dangerous assumption is that the Colombian state has the operational capacity or political will to protect demobilized rebels in remote rural areas where paramilitary influence is high.

Unaddressed Risks

Economic Instability: A drop in commodity prices or national revenue could lead the state to defund the rural development promises, triggering a return to conflict.
Public Rejection: A lack of urban support for the peace deal could lead to a political reversal in future elections, stripping the rebels of their legal protections.

Unconsidered Alternative

The delegation has not fully explored a federalist model that would grant regional autonomy to conflict affected zones. This could satisfy the demand for local control without requiring a total overhaul of the national political structure.