Colombia and FARC-EP Struggle for Peace: Government Delegation: Role 2. General Instructions + Confidential Instructions For General Pedro Carvajal, Government Delegation Custom Case Solution & Analysis

Evidence Brief: General Pedro Carvajal and the Colombian Peace Process

1. Operational Facts and Military Context

• Force Composition: The Colombian Armed Forces consist of approximately 450000 active personnel across the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
• Conflict Duration: The internal armed conflict with FARC-EP has spanned over five decades, resulting in more than 220000 deaths and millions of displaced persons.
• Military Success: Operational gains between 2002 and 2010 significantly weakened FARC leadership and reduced their troop numbers from 20000 to approximately 8000.
• Negotiation Structure: The General Sub-Commission on the End of the Conflict is the primary venue where active-duty military officers negotiate directly with FARC commanders.

2. Stakeholder Positions

• General Pedro Carvajal: Represents the institutional interests of the military. Prioritizes legal protection for soldiers and refuses any equivalence between the state and an illegal insurgency.
• President Juan Manuel Santos: Seeks a definitive peace agreement to secure his political legacy and unlock economic growth through rural development.
• FARC-EP Leadership: Demands transitional justice that treats all actors in the conflict equally and requires security guarantees against paramilitary violence.
• The Military Institution: Deeply skeptical of the Havana process; fears that peace will lead to a reduction in budget, prestige, and legal vulnerability for past actions.

3. Key Negotiation Metrics and Red Lines

• Transitional Justice: The military demands a specific legal framework that recognizes the legitimacy of state force and prevents soldiers from appearing before the same tribunals as FARC members.
• DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration): A non-negotiable requirement for the total surrender of weapons by FARC before political participation begins.
• Security Guarantees: Protection for demobilizing FARC members must not compromise the military presence in historically contested territories.

4. Information Gaps

• The specific number of active-duty personnel currently facing investigation for human rights violations is not disclosed in the role instructions.
• Detailed budget projections for the post-conflict military structure are absent.
• Internal polling data regarding troop morale and support for the Havana accords is not provided.

Strategic Analysis: Preserving Institutional Integrity

1. Core Strategic Question

• How can the Colombian Government Delegation secure a peace agreement that ensures FARC disarmament without creating a legal or moral equivalence between the state military and an illegal insurgency?

2. Structural Analysis

The negotiation operates within a high-stakes environment where the military institutional BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is a return to active combat. However, the military faces a legitimacy crisis if they are seen as the primary obstacle to peace. Using a Stakeholder Power Matrix, the military holds high power but declining public support for continued war. The primary friction point is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). If the JEP treats soldiers and guerrillas as equal combatants, the military hierarchy will likely withdraw support for the process, leading to a coup risk or mass resignations.

3. Strategic Options

4. Preliminary Recommendation

The delegation must pursue the Bifurcated Justice Model. The military cannot accept a framework that criminalizes the institution. By creating a distinct legal chamber for state agents within the JEP, the government satisfies the need for accountability while respecting the constitutional status of the Armed Forces. This preserves the internal stability of the military and ensures their cooperation during the implementation phase.

Implementation Roadmap: Transition and Verification

1. Critical Path

• Month 1-2: Finalize the technical protocols for the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities. Establish the Tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (Government, FARC, UN).
• Month 3: Initiate the movement of FARC troops to designated Transitory Hamlet Zones for disarmament.
• Month 4-6: Complete the 100% surrender of weapons to UN observers. Launch the specialized legal defense fund for military personnel facing JEP proceedings.

2. Key Constraints

• Legal Friction: The Constitutional Court must approve the transitional justice framework. Any delay here creates a vacuum that FARC or military hardliners will exploit.
• Territorial Vacuum: As FARC vacates territory, criminal gangs (BACRIM) and the ELN will attempt to seize drug trafficking routes. The military must have a rapid deployment plan to fill these gaps immediately.

3. Risk-Adjusted Implementation Strategy

The strategy focuses on institutional reassurance. To prevent military dissent, the government must launch an internal communication campaign emphasizing that peace is a military victory, not a surrender. Contingency plans must include specialized protection units for demobilizing FARC members to prevent assassinations that would collapse the deal. If FARC fails to meet the 180-day disarmament deadline, the military must be authorized to resume operations in specific sectors to maintain pressure.

Executive Review and BLUF

1. BLUF

The peace process hinges on the military institution. General Carvajal must secure a legal framework that treats state actors distinctly from insurgents. Failure to do so risks a total collapse of troop morale and potential institutional rebellion. The recommended path is to accept the Special Jurisdiction for Peace only if it includes a dedicated chamber for state agents that recognizes their constitutional legitimacy. This is the only way to ensure the military remains a partner in peace rather than a spoiler. The government must prioritize territorial control over optics to prevent a surge in organized crime following FARC demobilization.

2. Dangerous Assumption

The most consequential unchallenged premise is that FARC-EP possesses the internal discipline to ensure 100% compliance with disarmament orders across all fronts. If dissident factions remain active, the military will be legally constrained by the ceasefire while facing an asymmetric threat, leading to a rapid loss of public and institutional support.

3. Unaddressed Risks

• Political Volatility (High Probability/High Consequence): A change in administration or a negative plebiscite result could invalidate the legal protections promised to the military, leaving individual officers exposed to prosecution without the benefits of the peace framework.
• The ELN Factor (High Probability/Medium Consequence): The peace deal with FARC does not include the ELN. The military risk being overstretched as they manage FARC demobilization while simultaneously escalating combat operations against the ELN.

4. Unconsidered Alternative

The analysis overlooked a phased regional demobilization. Instead of a national ceasefire, the government could have negotiated a region-by-region transition. This would allow the military to concentrate forces in one area at a time, ensuring total state control before moving to the next sector, thereby reducing the risk of a territorial vacuum.

5. Verdict

APPROVED FOR LEADERSHIP REVIEW