Colombia and FARC-EP Struggle for Peace: FARC-EP Delegation: Role 1. General Instructions + Confidential Instructions For Diego Garzon, Head of FARC Delegation Custom Case Solution & Analysis

Section 1: Evidence Brief

Prepared by: Business Case Data Researcher

Financial Metrics and Economic Context

Rural Poverty Gap: Poverty in rural areas remains significantly higher than urban centers, with land ownership concentrated among less than 1 percent of the population holding over 50 percent of productive land.
Conflict Costs: The civil war has lasted over 50 years, resulting in over 220,000 deaths and millions of internally displaced persons.
Illicit Economy: Revenue from coca cultivation and illegal mining serves as the primary funding mechanism for insurgent operations, though exact figures are excluded from the general text to focus on political negotiation.
Peace Dividend: Estimated increase in GDP growth of 1 to 2 percent annually following a successful peace accord.

Operational Facts

FARC-EP Strength: Approximately 7,000 to 10,000 active combatants plus a larger network of urban militias and civilian supporters.
Geographic Control: Influence remains strongest in the southern and eastern jungles and mountainous border regions where state presence is minimal.
Negotiation Structure: Six-point agenda: 1. Agrarian Development, 2. Political Participation, 3. End of Conflict, 4. Illicit Drugs, 5. Victims Rights, 6. Implementation and Verification.
Timeline: Negotiations in Havana began in 2012, operating under the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Stakeholder Positions

Diego Garzon (Head of FARC Delegation): Committed to structural change in rural Colombia; views the transition to a political party as the ultimate goal but requires ironclad safety guarantees against paramilitary violence.
The Secretariat: FARC high command; maintains strict discipline over fronts but remains wary of government betrayal based on the historical precedent of the Union Patriotica massacre.
President Juan Manuel Santos: Seeks peace to secure his legacy and modernize the economy; faces significant domestic pressure from the political right.
Alvaro Uribe: Former president and leader of the opposition; advocates for military defeat over negotiation and views any concessions as impunity.

Information Gaps

The specific mechanism for financing the transition of thousands of combatants into civilian life is not detailed.
The exact level of command and control the Havana delegation holds over rogue fronts in drug-heavy territories is unverified.
Specific budgetary commitments for the Rural Development Reform are not quantified in the case exhibits.

Section 2: Strategic Analysis

Prepared by: Market Strategy Consultant

Core Strategic Question

How can the FARC-EP successfully trade its military capability for a sustainable and safe political presence while ensuring the government delivers on structural rural reform?

Structural Analysis

The PESTEL framework reveals that the political and legal dimensions are the primary bottlenecks. Politically, the FARC-EP lacks a popular mandate, with high disapproval ratings in urban centers. Legally, the tension between domestic peace and international justice standards (ICC) limits the scope of amnesties. Socially, the rural-urban divide creates a fragmented constituency. The structural problem is one of credible commitment: the FARC-EP must disarm before the government fully implements reforms, creating a period of maximum vulnerability.

Strategic Options

Option 1: Maximalist Reform-First Strategy. Demand full implementation of land reform and the dismantling of paramilitary groups before a single weapon is surrendered.
Trade-offs: High security for members but risks a total collapse of talks as the government cannot deliver these outcomes while fighting continues.
Resource Requirements: Continued military readiness and high-intensity logistics in rural zones.

Option 2: Gradualist Political Integration. Agree to a phased decommissioning in exchange for immediate seats in Congress and localized development zones.
Trade-offs: Faster political entry but risks internal fracturing if rank-and-file members feel the leadership sold out for personal positions.
Resource Requirements: Extensive internal communication and UN-monitored security corridors.

Option 3: International Guarantee Model. Pivot the strategy to focus almost entirely on international verification (UN, CELAC) as the primary safeguard for both disarmament and reform.
Trade-offs: Higher probability of physical survival for members but reduces the FARC-EP sovereignty over the peace process.
Resource Requirements: Diplomatic capital and coordination with multiple foreign governments.

Preliminary Recommendation

Pursue Option 3. The central obstacle is the lack of trust. Only a third-party verification mechanism can bridge the gap between the FARC-EP demand for safety and the government demand for decommissioning. This path prioritizes the survival of the organization as a political entity over the immediate achievement of all Marxist-Leninist economic goals.

Section 3: Implementation Roadmap

Prepared by: Operations and Implementation Planner

Critical Path

Phase 1 (Months 1-3): Bilateral Ceasefire and Concentration. Establish 20 to 30 Transitional Local Zones where combatants gather. This requires immediate logistics for food, medicine, and shelter for 10,000 people.
Phase 2 (Months 4-9): Decommissioning and Identification. UN observers collect and destroy weapons in three phases (30%, 30%, 40%). Simultaneous issuance of civil identification to all members.
Phase 3 (Months 10-18): Political Launch. Transition from a military command structure to a political party hierarchy. This involves training 500+ members in public administration and campaign management.

Key Constraints

Security Vacuum: As FARC-EP exits territories, other illegal groups (ELN, Clan del Golfo) will attempt to seize coca routes. The government military must occupy these areas immediately, or the peace process will be seen as a failure of public safety.
Internal Cohesion: Middle-ranking commanders who profit from the illicit economy have a financial incentive to defect. Implementation must include viable economic alternatives that match their current income levels.

Risk-Adjusted Implementation Strategy

The plan assumes a 20 percent defection rate. To mitigate this, the implementation must focus on collective projects (cooperatives) rather than individual stipends. This keeps the social fabric of the organization intact during the transition. Contingency plans must include emergency extraction protocols for leaders if paramilitary activity spikes in urban centers during the first election cycle.

Section 4: Executive Review and BLUF

Prepared by: Senior Partner and Executive Reviewer

BLUF

The FARC-EP must prioritize international verification and collective security over immediate structural land reform. The strategy of using military power to force economic change has reached a point of diminishing returns. Success depends on a disciplined transition to a political party where the organization can advocate for its base within the legal system. The primary threat is not the negotiation table, but the security vacuum created during the demobilization phase. Without guaranteed physical safety for the rank-and-file, the organization will splinter, and the peace accord will fail.

Dangerous Assumption

The most consequential unchallenged premise is that the Colombian state possesses the operational capacity and political will to protect demobilized FARC members in remote areas. History suggests the state is often complicit in or indifferent to the targeting of left-wing activists by paramilitary remnants.

Unaddressed Risks

Legal Reciprocity: If the FARC-EP leaders face prison sentences while military officers receive amnesties, the internal command structure will collapse. This risk has a high probability and fatal consequences for the deal.
Economic Sustainability: The plan lacks a concrete funding source for the multi-billion dollar rural development program. If the economy slows, the government will likely deprioritize these investments, leading to a resurgence of rural unrest.

Unconsidered Alternative

The team failed to consider a federated political model where the FARC-EP maintains localized administrative control over specific rural districts (Autonomous Zones) as a middle ground between a central state and a rebel territory. This would provide a geographic power base and a testing ground for their agrarian policies without requiring immediate national dominance.