Gillette's "We Believe" Campaign: How can resilience help when embracing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion as values? Custom Case Solution & Analysis

1. Evidence Brief: Case Data Extraction

Financial Metrics

• Market Share Erosion: Gillette market share in the US men razors and blades market fell from approximately 70% in 2010 to 54% in 2017 (Exhibit: Market Trends).
• Competitive Pricing: Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) competitors like Dollar Shave Club and Harrys offered blades at $1-2 per unit, while Gillette Fusion5 blades retailed for $4-5 per unit (Paragraph 4).
• Marketing Commitment: P&G pledged to donate $1 million per year for three years to non-profit organizations designed to help men of all ages achieve their best (Paragraph 12).
• Parent Company Impact: P&G reported a $8 billion non-cash write-down of Gillette in 2019, though management attributed this primarily to currency fluctuations and the rise of the beard culture rather than the campaign (Exhibit: Financial Summary).

Operational Facts

• Campaign Launch: The We Believe short film was released on January 13, 2019, on YouTube and social media platforms (Paragraph 1).
• Digital Engagement: The video reached 30 million views in the first week. The YouTube like-to-dislike ratio was approximately 1:2, with over 1.5 million dislikes (Paragraph 8).
• Brand Heritage: Gillette had used the tagline The Best a Man Can Get since its 1989 Super Bowl debut, focusing on masculine success, romance, and athletic achievement (Paragraph 3).
• Strategic Pivot: The campaign shifted focus from the functional benefits of the product to a social commentary on toxic masculinity and the #MeToo movement (Paragraph 6).

Stakeholder Positions

• Pankaj Bhalla (Brand Director): Maintained that the brand needed to be relevant to younger consumers and that the backlash was expected but necessary for long-term growth (Paragraph 14).
• Traditional Consumer Segment: Expressed significant hostility, viewing the ad as an indictment of their gender; many posted videos of flushing Gillette products down toilets (Paragraph 9).
• Younger Demographic (Gen Z/Millennials): Shown in surveys to prefer brands that take a stand on social issues, representing the target growth segment (Paragraph 11).
• Retail Partners: Remained neutral but concerned about potential inventory turnover slowdowns during peak boycott calls (Paragraph 15).

Information Gaps

• Direct Sales Attribution: The case does not provide week-over-week sales data immediately following the January launch to isolate the boycott effect from the general downward trend.
• Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC): Lack of data on whether the campaign reduced CAC for younger users compared to traditional functional advertising.
• Internal Employee Sentiment: No data on how P&G or Gillette staff responded to the campaign internally.

2. Strategic Analysis

Core Strategic Question

• Can Gillette successfully reposition a legacy brand as a social value leader to attract younger demographics without permanently alienating the core customer base that provides the majority of its current revenue?

Structural Analysis

Brand Identity Prism: Gillette traditionally occupied a space of functional excellence and aspirational masculinity. The We Believe campaign attempted to shift the brand personality from a supportive tool to a moral authority. This created a structural misalignment with the existing customer self-image, leading to the cognitive dissonance observed in the backlash.

Jobs-to-be-Done (JTBD): For older consumers, the job of a razor is functional (clean shave) and psychological (feeling groomed). For younger consumers, the job increasingly includes social signaling (supporting ethical brands). Gillette attempted to solve for the latter while ignoring that the former is a prerequisite for brand loyalty.

Strategic Options

Option 1: Resilience and Doubling Down. Maintain the current DEI trajectory. Use the $1M/year fund to build concrete community programs that move beyond video content.
Trade-off: Sustains short-term brand hostility but builds long-term equity with Gen Z.
Requirement: High tolerance for social media volatility and sustained marketing spend.

Option 2: Bifurcated Brand Strategy. Return the core Gillette brand to functional excellence (The Best a Man Can Get) while launching a sub-brand or specific product lines (e.g., Gillette Planet KIND) that carry the social and DEI messaging.
Trade-off: Reduces brand risk but dilutes the impact of the social message.
Requirement: Increased operational complexity in managing multiple brand identities.

Option 3: Tactical Retreat to Product-Centricity. Acknowledge the feedback and pivot marketing back to product innovation (e.g., heated razors, skin protection).
Trade-off: Stabilizes the core base but leaves the brand vulnerable to continued disruption by DTC brands with stronger social identities.
Requirement: R&D investment to reclaim the functional lead.

Preliminary Recommendation

Gillette should pursue Option 1. The market share data confirms that the traditional functional-only approach was already failing against DTC competitors. Resilience is the only path to relevance. The brand must move from social commentary to social action to prove the DEI values are not just a marketing veneer.

3. Implementation Roadmap

Critical Path

• Month 1-3: Action Validation. Audit the $1M annual donation. Shift from broad grants to high-visibility partnerships with organizations like Boys & Girls Clubs of America to show tangible community impact.
• Month 4-6: Message Calibration. Pivot future content from what men do wrong to what men do right. Focus on positive masculinity to bridge the gap with the alienated core while maintaining DEI values.
• Month 7-12: Product-Value Integration. Launch product bundles where a portion of proceeds directly supports the DEI initiatives, making the social value a tangible part of the purchase.

Key Constraints

• Marketing-Product Gap: The campaign addressed social values but did not solve the pricing disadvantage against Harrys and Dollar Shave Club. If the product remains expensive, the social message will be dismissed as a distraction.
• Retailer Pressure: Large-scale retailers (Walmart, Target) prioritize turnover. If the boycott results in visible shelf-stagnation, retail partners may demand price cuts or promotional spend that erodes margins.

Risk-Adjusted Implementation

The strategy assumes that the vocal minority on social media does not represent the silent majority of purchasers. To mitigate the risk of a sustained revenue drop, the implementation must include a contingency to re-introduce functional advertising (product-focused) alongside the purpose-driven content. This 70/30 split (70% product, 30% purpose) ensures the brand does not lose its identity as a grooming leader while it builds its identity as a social leader.

4. Executive Review and BLUF

BLUF

Gillette must stay the course on its DEI commitment but shift from provocative commentary to tangible community action. The 16% market share loss prior to the campaign proves that the status quo was terminal. While the We Believe campaign triggered a significant backlash, it successfully broke the brand out of a decade-long stagnation in relevance. The path forward requires resilience: maintain the DEI values, recalibrate the tone to be inclusive of all men, and fix the underlying price-value gap that DTC competitors continue to exploit. Success will be measured by Gen Z acquisition, not the approval of a legacy base that was already migrating.

Dangerous Assumption

The single most dangerous assumption is that brand purpose can substitute for price competitiveness. Consumers may support a brand with values, but they will not indefinitely pay a 300% premium for a commodity product (razor blades) when cheaper, high-quality alternatives exist. The ad addressed the heart, but the business model still fails the wallet.

Unaddressed Risks

• Brand Hijacking: The risk that the Gillette brand becomes a permanent political lightning rod, where every future product launch is judged through a political lens rather than a quality lens. (Probability: High | Consequence: Moderate)
• Retailer De-listing: If the boycott results in a 5-10% sustained drop in velocity, major retailers may reduce shelf space in favor of private labels or DTC brands. (Probability: Moderate | Consequence: High)

Unconsidered Alternative

The team failed to consider a Corporate vs. Product Brand Split. P&G could have moved the DEI and social advocacy to the corporate level (P&G as the Force for Good) while keeping Gillette focused on the grooming experience. This would have insulated the specific product brand from the culture war while still achieving the organizational DEI goals.

Verdict

APPROVED FOR LEADERSHIP REVIEW