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The Rise and Fall of AIG Custom Case Solution & Analysis
1. Evidence Brief: Business Case Data Researcher
Financial Metrics
- Total Assets: Exceeded 1 trillion dollars at the peak of operations before the 2008 crisis.
- Net Loss: Reported a record 99.3 billion dollar loss for the full year of 2004.
- Credit Default Swap (CDS) Portfolio: AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) wrote over 440 billion dollars in CDS contracts.
- Subprime Exposure: Approximately 58 billion dollars of the CDS portfolio was tied to multi-sector collateralized debt obligations containing subprime mortgages.
- Collateral Calls: Goldman Sachs and other counterparts demanded billions in collateral as mortgage bond ratings dropped.
- Government Intervention: Initial credit facility of 85 billion dollars from the Federal Reserve, eventually expanding to a 182 billion dollar total bailout package.
- Securities Lending Program: Suffered losses exceeding 20 billion dollars due to liquidity mismatches in reinvested cash collateral.
Operational Facts
- Corporate Structure: AIG functioned as a massive insurance conglomerate with over 70 state-regulated US subsidiaries and numerous international units.
- AIGFP Unit: Operated out of London and Connecticut with fewer than 500 employees but generated a disproportionate share of corporate profits.
- Regulatory Oversight: Primarily regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which lacked the capacity to monitor the complex derivative trades of the financial products division.
- Credit Rating: Maintained a AAA rating for decades, which allowed the firm to issue CDS without posting initial collateral.
Stakeholder Positions
- Maurice Hank Greenberg: Former CEO who built the firm through aggressive global expansion and strict internal controls; departed in 2005 amid accounting investigations.
- Martin Sullivan: CEO during the initial subprime expansion; focused on maintaining the growth trajectory established by his predecessor.
- Joseph Cassano: Head of AIGFP; maintained that the CDS portfolio carried zero risk of actual economic loss.
- Robert Willumstad: Chairman and later CEO who attempted to address the liquidity crisis in mid-2008.
- US Treasury and Federal Reserve: Acted as the lender of last resort to prevent systemic global financial collapse.
Information Gaps
- Specific internal risk models used by AIGFP to justify the zero-risk assumption are not fully detailed in the case text.
- The exact communication logs between the OTS and AIG leadership regarding the systemic risk of the CDS portfolio are missing.
- Detailed breakdown of the 20 billion dollar securities lending loss by specific asset class is not provided.
2. Strategic Analysis: Market Strategy Consultant
Core Strategic Question
- The primary strategic dilemma: How can a global insurance conglomerate manage a high-alpha financial derivatives unit without compromising the solvency of its regulated insurance subsidiaries?
- The secondary problem: Failure to recognize that a AAA credit rating is a fragile operational asset, not a permanent competitive advantage.
Structural Analysis
Applying the Value Chain of Risk analysis reveals a fatal flaw in the AIG model. The firm treated the CDS portfolio as an insurance product without applying insurance-grade actuarial rigor. The PESTEL framework highlights a regulatory vacuum where the OTS was ill-equipped to oversee a global derivatives powerhouse. The core issue was an agency problem: AIGFP employees received massive bonuses based on mark-to-model profits, while the parent company bore the tail risk of mark-to-market losses.
Strategic Options
| Option | Rationale | Trade-offs | Resource Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aggressive De-risking (2007) | Exit the CDS market as subprime defaults began to rise. | Loss of high-margin revenue; potential early termination penalties. | Specialized liquidation team; significant cash reserves for settlements. |
| Structural Ringfencing | Legally and financially decouple AIGFP from the insurance subsidiaries. | Protects policyholders but removes the AAA rating benefit for AIGFP. | Complex legal restructuring; capital reallocation. |
| Capital Infusion and Transparency | Raise 20-30 billion dollars in private equity before the crisis peaked. | Significant shareholder dilution; loss of executive control. | Investment banking consortium; full disclosure of derivative exposure. |